

CI BRIEFING TALKING POINTS

DD/A Registry

File

Special Meetings


I. Current Developments In Counterintelligence From A Community Perspective:

- o Despite a limited EO 12036 definition of CI we have moved with SCC/CI support to a comprehensive threat and total protective countermeasure concept.
 - This combines counter-HUMINT (the traditional CI) with counter-SIGINT, counter-Imagery and an integrated approach to personnel, physical, document, computer and operational security.
- o At SCC/CI direction we have produced for the Community:
 - A multidisciplinary Baseline Report providing a factual basis for an expanded CI concept and raising a wide variety of issues for SCC/CI consideration.
 - A first overall assessment of the effectiveness of the total hostile intelligence service threat and of United States counter-measures thereto.
- o Because CI analytical tools have thus become multidisciplinary, the SCC/CI has directed the DCI to establish a small interagency-staffed center for macro-analysis of the threat and for net assessments. This is now being done.


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- The center will consist of three persons, two of whom are on board now. The third will be a member furnished by DoD. The center will utilize finished departmental studies and will not maintain raw counterintelligence data files.
 - The center is also responsible for creating and maintaining a national counterintelligence production register.
 - Other possible central departmental-level data bases and related guidelines are still under consideration.
- o Community progress has been made in developing standards and doctrine involving double agents.
- A new national double agent program directive, for which the DoD Director for Counterintelligence and Security Policy took the initiative, was agreed upon and is being implemented. A subsidiary directive has established standards for evaluating information for passage to hostile intelligence services via double agents.
 - The DCI has been assigned responsibility for and has established a national double agent information passage registry. He is also charged with periodically analyzing the implications of the aggregate passed information.
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- o In the counter-SIGINT field the SCC Telecommunications Protection Subcommittee (under [REDACTED]) has been implementing [REDACTED] with some positive results but progress is still unduly slow. Dr. [REDACTED] plans to accelerate the work of his Subcommittee during 1979.
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- o The NSC Technology Transfer Group has also moved slowly to date in its implementation of PRM-31, part of the counter-HUMINT spectrum.
 - o The DCI Security Committee has done some good work in its Community sources and methods and compartmented intelligence protective security standard-setting fields but is hampered by the limitations on its jurisdiction and by the normal bureaucratic impediments of an interagency committee. This is exemplified by the study done by it

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- o Most of the resources involved in multidisciplinary CI are not in the NFIP, i.e. most of counter-SIGINT and counter-imagery. The HUMINT CI resources which are in the NFIP are relatively small.

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II. Assessment Findings

CIA FCI:

- o From a program manager standpoint, the most important finding is that CIA capabilities and activities in CI coverage abroad have been declining. There are too many competing priorities and limited

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- Imagery: We should establish a national policy on imagery.
- Comprehensive Countermeasures:
 - Those critical categories of U.S. information it is vital to protect should be identified by a competent national authority.
 - Analysis of the multidisciplinary foreign intelligence threat should be improved.
 - National policy guidance should be provided to ensure greater consistency in the application of protective security measures, particularly greater uniformity in the use of the polygraph.
 - More, better organized and more effective exploitation of OPSEC (operational security) should be achieved, including designating a focal point for DoD OPSEC and applying OPSEC techniques in other areas of the Executive Branch.
 - CI-related resource categories should be established for 25X1C
NFIP to achieve the benefits of a complete cross-program display and analysis of CI costs.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration ✓

The attached is for use at the Intelligence
Community retreat this Friday and Saturday.

STATINTL

SA/DCI/CI

Date 22 March 1979

FORM 5-75 1 USE PREVIOUS

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 23 JUL 1979
TO: OLC		
ROOM NO. 6B 15	BUILDING Headquarters	
REMARKS:		
<p><i>Jan CCM/FPH</i> <i>Unlabeled FPH has material,</i> <i>this can be returned to</i> <i>DD/A. HLA</i> <i>Per Mike -</i> <i>no, do not</i> <i>want for FPH.</i> <i>Return to DDA.</i></p>		
FROM: DDA		
ROOM NO. 7D 18	BUILDING Headquarters	EXTENSION 6542

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

19 March 1979

NOTE FOR: Deputy to the DCI for
Resource Management
Deputy to the DCI for
National Intelligence
Tasking
Deputy Director for
National Intelligence
Assessment
✓ Deputy Director for
Administration
Special Assistant to the
DCI [REDACTED]

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FYI, attached is a preliminary
agenda for the Intelligence Community
Retreat 23-24 March [REDACTED] given to
DDCI by DCI today.

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You should be prepared to lead
discussions as indicated. If you
prepare issue or discussion papers,
you may want to distribute to parti-
cipants by Thursday evening prior to
the meeting.
[REDACTED]

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RETREAT AGENDA

23-24 March 1979

Review progress and immediate objectives of the community role of

RM

CT

NFAC

CI

Each Deputy Director/Special Assistant to lead a discussion of these two topics: One hour each RM/CT/NFAC - Friday night; 45 minutes - CI - Saturday morning.

Look at status of community program managers as regards the contribution of their programs to community objectives:

NSA	Navy
NRO	Air Force
DIA	Treasury
INR	Commerce
Army	FBI

Two-hour discussion - Saturday morning. RM lead on NRO; CT on NSA; NFAC on DIA and INR; CI on FBI; DDCI on others.

Review actions to develop a better community outlook and sense of teamwork:

NFIB?	DCI/DDCI visits?
Breakfasts?	Other
Conference Calls?	

DCI lead discussion - one hour - Saturday.

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HANDLE VIA [REDACTED]
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